

SOSC 6030T: The Political Economy of Development

Dong Zhang

Fall Semester, 2026–2027

E-mail: dongzhang@ust.hk

Office Hours: Tuesday 2:00 pm–3:00 pm

Class Hours: Tuesday 9:00 am–11:50 am

Teaching Assistant: Pat Shu Roy HO

Course Website: accessed via canvas

Office Location: Academic Building 2381

Class Room: Rm. 2126A

E-mail: psrho@ust.hk

Course Description

This seminar is devoted to understanding various dimensions of development, including economic development, state capacity, and democratic accountability. Why are some countries rich while others remain poor? Why do some countries develop strong and effective states while others do not? And what explains the rise and resilience of democracies in some countries, contrasted with the persistence of authoritarian rule in others? This course explores the key analytical concepts and theories that explain the development trajectories of countries, with an emphasis on the rigorous application of empirical methods.

Enrollment Requirement

It is recommended that students have prior coursework in research methods.

Teaching and Learning Activities

This course consists of classroom discussions, presentations, research, and writing.

Required Texts and Materials

There are no required text books for this course. All readings will be made available in electronic form through the course website.

Intended Learning Outcomes (ILOs)

By the end of the course, the aim is that students will have improved the ability to:

1. Critically analyze major theories and concepts of economic and political development from a comparative perspective;
2. Apply empirical methods to evaluate the causes and consequences of different development trajectories;
3. Develop arguments or theories about development using empirical evidence.

Assessment and Grading

Assessment Task	Details	Weight (%)	Deadline
Participation	• Complete all readings before class. • Submit one to two discussion questions via Canvas. • Actively contribute to class discussions.	20%	Weekly, submit discussion questions by 8 PM Monday
Presentation	• <i>As a presenter:</i> Deliver two to three in-class presentations on assigned papers (depending on enrollment). Assume the role of the author(s): present the paper's motivation, theoretical framework, data, and key findings as if you were the author defending the work. Be prepared to respond to questions and critiques raised by the discussant and the broader audience. • <i>As a discussant:</i> Serve as a discussant for two to three papers throughout the semester, in the style of an academic conference discussant. Prepare a structured commentary that (1) briefly summarizes the paper's contribution and situates it within the relevant literature, (2) identifies the paper's key strengths, (3) raises substantive methodological or theoretical critiques, and (4) offers constructive suggestions for improvement. • Submit slides via Canvas by 8:00 PM on Monday of the week of your assigned session.	40%	Slides due Monday, 8:00 PM of the assigned week.
Final Project	• Develop an original research proposal that examines a question related to political economy (approx. 20 double-spaced pages). • Present your proposal in class on November 17 or 24 (20% of final grade), and submit a final written manuscript.	40%	Friday, December 18, 23:59 PM

Please note that **ANY late submissions** of the final project (due Friday, December 18, 23:59 PM) will incur a one-step grade reduction per day (e.g., A to A-, A- to B+), with each 24-hour period starting from the deadline counting as one day.

Course AI Policy

- AI tools in this course are restricted to basic editing functions (grammar checking and proofreading). Any content beyond basic editing must be entirely your own work. Using AI-generated content without attribution constitutes academic misconduct.
- Each submission must include a disclosure statement if AI tools were used, detailing which tools were used and how. Failure to provide this disclosure will be treated as a violation of academic integrity.
- If you're uncertain about appropriate AI use for any assignment, consult with the instructor before proceeding.

Course Schedule and Reading List

Week 1: Introduction

Tuesday, September 1

- There is NO required reading for this week.

Week 2: Institutions and Development

Tuesday, September 8

- Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," *American Economic Review* 91 (2001): 1369–1401.
- Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: the Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," *The Journal of Economic History* 49 (1989): 803–832.

Recommended:

- Douglas C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
- Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117 (2002): 1231–1294.
- Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, "Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth," in *Handbook of Economic Growth*, ed. Philippe Aghion and Stephen Durlauf (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005), 385–472.
- Kenneth L. Sokoloff and Stanley L. Engerman, "History Lessons: Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 14 (2000): 217–232.

-
- David Y. Albouy, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Comment,” *American Economic Review* 102 (2012): 3059–3076.
 - Edward L. Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, “Do Institutions Cause Growth?,” *Journal of Economic Growth* 9 (2004): 271–303.
 - Areendam Chanda, C. Justin Cook, and Louis Putterman, “Persistence of Fortune: Accounting for Population Movements, There Was No Post-Columbian Reversal,” *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 6 (2014): 1–28.
 - Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi, “Institutions Rule: the Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development,” *Journal of Economic Growth* 9 (2004): 131–165.
 - Avner Greif, “Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition,” *The American Economic Review* 83 (1993): 525–548.
 - Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom, and Barry R. Weingast, “Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild,” *Journal of Political Economy* 102 (1994): 745–776.
 - Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, “The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins,” *Journal of Economic Literature* 46 (2008): 285–332.
 - James Mahoney, *Colonialism and Postcolonial Development: Spanish America in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
 - Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer, “History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India,” *American Economic Review* 95 (2005): 1190–1213.
 - Nathan Nunn, “The Long-Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123 (2008): 139–176.
 - Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou, “Pre-Colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development,” *Econometrica* 81 (2013): 113–152.
 - Melissa Dell, “The Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining Mita,” *Econometrica* 78 (2010): 1863–1903.

Week 3: State Building and Political Order

Tuesday, September 15

- Lars-Erik Cederman, Paola Galano Toro, Luc Girardin, and Guy Schvitz, “War Did Make States: Revisiting the Bellicist Paradigm in Early Modern Europe,” *International Organization* 77 (2023): 324–362.
- Anna Grzymala-Busse, “Tilly Goes to Church: the Religious and Medieval Roots of European State Fragmentation,” *American Political Science Review* 118 (2024): 88–107.

Recommended:

- Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990* (Oxford: Blackwell Press, 1992).
- Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
- Mark Dincecco, *Political Transformations and Public Finances: Europe, 1650–1913* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
- Levi Margaret, *Of Rule and Revenue* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
- Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson, “The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics,” *American Economic Review* 99 (2009): 1218–44.
- Miguel Angel Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America* (University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 2002).
- Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
- Isabela Mares and Didac Queralt, “The Non-Democratic Origins of Income Taxation,” *Comparative Political Studies* 48 (2015): 1974–2009.
- Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
- Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty* (New York: Penguin Press, 2019).
- Dan Slater, *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
- Wenkai He, *Public Interest and State Legitimation: Early Modern England, Japan, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023).
- Raúl Sánchez De La Sierra, “On the Origins of the State: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo,” *Journal of Political Economy* 128 (2020): 32–74.
- Lisa Blaydes and Anna Grzymala-Busse, “Historical State Formation Within and Beyond Europe,” *World Politics* 77 (2025): 205–222.

Week 4: State Capacity and Development

Tuesday, September 22

- Melissa M. Lee and Nan Zhang, “Legibility and the Informational Foundations of State Capacity,” *The Journal of Politics* 79 (2017): 118–132.
- Richard F. Doner, Bryan K. Ritchie, and Dan Slater, “Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective,” *International Organization* 59 (2005): 327–361.

Recommended:

- Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," *European Journal of Sociology* 25 (1984): 185–213.
- Hillel Soifer and Matthias vom Hau, "Unpacking the Strength of the State: The Utility of State Infrastructural Power," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 43 (2008): 219–230.
- James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).
- Thomas Brambor, Agustín Goenaga, Johannes Lindvall, and Jan Teorell, "The Lay of the Land: Information Capacity and the Modern State," *Comparative Political Studies* 53 (2020): 175–213.
- Jeremy Bowles, "Identifying the Rich: Registration, Taxation, and Access to the State in Tanzania," *American Political Science Review* 118 (2024): 602–618.
- Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).
- Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: the Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).
- Alice Amsden, *Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
- Stephan Haggard, *Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).
- Robert Wade, *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
- Peter B. Evans, *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
- Atul Kohli, *State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
- Melissa Dell, Nathan Lane, and Pablo Querubin, "The Historical State, Local Collective Action, and Economic Development in Vietnam," *Econometrica* 86 (2018): 2083–2121.

Week 5: Democracy

Tuesday, September 29

- Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared, "Income and Democracy," *American Economic Review* 98 (2008): 808–842.
- Ben Ansell and David Samuels, "Inequality and Democratization: A Contractarian Approach," *Comparative Political Studies* 43 (2010): 1543–1574

Recommended:

- Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53 (1959): 69–105.
- Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," *World Politics* 49 (1997): 155–183.
- Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, "Endogenous Democratization," *World Politics* 55 (2003): 517–549.
- Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
- Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973).
- Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Economic Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
- Carles Boix, *Democracy and Redistribution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
- Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, "Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule," *American Political Science Review* 106 (2012): 495–516.
- Daniel Ziblatt, "Does Landholding Inequality Block Democratization? A Test of the "Bread and Democracy" Thesis and the Case of Prussia," *World Politics* 60 (2008): 610–641.
- Ben Ansell and David Samuels, *Inequality and Democratization: An Elite Competition Approach* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
- Bryn Rosenfeld, *The Autocratic Middle Class: How State Dependency Reduces the Demand for Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020).
- Daron Acemoglu, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James A. Robinson, "Democracy Does Cause Growth," *Journal of Political Economy* 127 (2019): 47–100.
- Robin Burgess, Remi Jedwab, Edward Miguel, Ameet Morjaria, and Gerard Padró i Miquel, "The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya," *American Economic Review* 105 (2015): 1817–1851.
- John Gerring, Strom C. Thacker, and Rodrigo Alfaro, "Democracy and Human Development," *The Journal of Politics* 74 (2012): 1–17.
- Robin Harding and David Stasavage, "What Democracy Does (and Doesn't Do) for Basic Services: School Fees, School Inputs, and African Elections," *The Journal of Politics* 76 (2014): 229–245.
- Agustina S. Paglayan, "The Non-Democratic Roots of Mass Education: Evidence from 200 Years," *American Political Science Review* 115 (2021): 179–198.

Week 6: Dictatorship

Tuesday, October 6

- Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats," *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (2007): 1279–1301.
- Beatriz Magaloni, "Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule," *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (2008): 715–741.

Recommended:

- Barbara Geddes, "What Do We Know about Democratization After Twenty Years?," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 115–144.
- Ronald Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of Dictatorship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
- Jennifer Gandhi, *Political Institutions Under Dictatorship* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
- Milan W. Svobik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
- Joseph Wright, "Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment," *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (2008): 322–343.
- Beatriz Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
- Kenneth F. Greene, *Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
- Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, *How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse* (Cambridge University Press, 2018).
- Thomas Pepinsky, "The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism," *British Journal of Political Science* 44 (2014): 631–653.
- Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
- Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman, *Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022).

Week 7: Democratic Backsliding and Autocratization

Tuesday, October 13

- Rachel Beatty Riedl, Paul Friesen, Jennifer McCoy, and Kenneth Roberts, "Democratic Backsliding, Resilience, and Resistance," *World Politics* 77 (2025): 151–177.

-
- Daniel Treisman, “How Great is the Current Danger to Democracy? Assessing the Risk with Historical Data,” *Comparative Political Studies* 56 (2023): 1924–1952.

Recommended:

- Nancy Bermeo, “On Democratic Backsliding,” *Journal of Democracy* 27 (2016): 5–19.
- Larry Diamond, “Democratic Regression in Comparative Perspective: Scope, Methods, and Causes,” *Democratization* 28 (2021): 22–42.
- Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “Democracy’s Surprising Resilience,” *Journal of Democracy* 34 (2023): 5–20.
- Andrew T. Little and Anne Meng, “Measuring Democratic Backsliding,” *PS: Political Science & Politics* 57 (2024): 149–161.
- Marina Nord, Fabio Angiolillo, Martin Lundstedt, Felix Wiebrecht, and Staffan Lindberg, “When Autocratization is Reversed: Episodes of U-Turns Since 1900,” *Democratization*, 2025, 1–24.
- Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, *How Democracies Die* (New York: Crown, 2018).
- Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, *Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World* (Cambridge University Press, 2021).
- Kurt Weyland, *Democracy’s Resilience to Populism’s Threat: Countering Global Alarmism* (Cambridge University Press, 2024).
- Susan C. Stokes, *The Backsliders: Why Leaders Undermine Their Own Democracies* (Princeton University Press, 2025).
- Sergei Guriev and Elias Papaioannou, “The Political Economy of Populism,” *Journal of Economic Literature* 60 (2022): 753–832.
- Helen V. Milner, “Voting for Populism in Europe: Globalization, Technological Change, and the Extreme Right,” *Comparative Political Studies* 54 (2021): 2286–2320.

Week 8: Corruption

Tuesday, October 20

- Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel, “Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets,” *Journal of Political Economy* 115 (2007): 1020–1048.
- Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan, “Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments,” *American Economic Review* 101 (2011): 1274–1311.

Recommended:

- Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, “Corruption,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 108 (1993): 599–617.

-
- David C. Kang, *Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines* (Cambridge University Press, 2002).
 - Raymond Fisman, "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," *American Economic Review* 91 (2001): 1095–1102.
 - Marianne Bertrand, Simeon Djankov, Rema Hanna, and Sendhil Mullainathan, "Obtaining A Driver's License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 122 (2007): 1639–1676.
 - Benjamin A. Olken and Patrick Barron, "The Simple Economics of Extortion: Evidence from Trucking in Aceh," *Journal of Political Economy* 117 (2009): 417–452.
 - Jordan Gans-Morse, Mariana Borges, Alexey Makarin, Theresa Mannah-Blankson, Andre Nickow, and Dong Zhang, "Reducing Bureaucratic Corruption: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on What Works," *World Development* 105 (2018): 171–188.
 - Raymond Fisman, Sergei Guriev, Carolin Ioramashvili, and Alexander Plekhanov, "Corruption and Firm Growth: Evidence from around the World," *The Economic Journal* 134 (2024): 1494–1516.
 - Sarah Brierley, "Unprincipled Principals: Co-Opted Bureaucrats and Corruption in Ghana," *American Journal of Political Science* 64 (2020): 209–222.
 - David Szakonyi, "Corruption and Co-Optation in Autocracy: Evidence from Russia," *American Political Science Review* 119 (2025): 402–419.
 - Taylor C. Boas, F. Daniel Hidalgo, and Marcus André Melo, "Norms Versus Action: Why Voters Fail to Sanction malfeasance in Brazil," *American Journal of Political Science* 63 (2019): 385–400.
 - John McMillan and Pablo Zoido, "How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18 (2002): 69–92.

Week 9: Natural Resources and Development

Tuesday, October 27

- Michael L. Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy," *World Politics* 53 (2001): 325–361.
- Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo, "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse," *American Political Science Review* 105 (2011): 1–26.

Recommended:

- Terry Lynn Karl, *The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States* (University of California Press, 1997).
- Michael L. Ross, *The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations* (Princeton University Press, 2012).

-
- Michael L. Ross, "What Have We learned About the Resource Curse?," *Annual Review of Political Science* 18 (2015): 239–259.
 - Victor Menaldo, *The Institutions Curse: Natural Resources, Politics, and Development* (Cambridge University Press, 2016).
 - Thad Dunning, *Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes* (Cambridge University Press, 2008).
 - Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, *Oil is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States* (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
 - Jørgen J. Andersen and Michael L. Ross, "The Big Oil Change: A Closer Look at the Haber-Menaldo Analysis," *Comparative Political Studies* 47 (2014): 993–1021.
 - Yu-Ming Liou and Paul Musgrave, "Refining the Oil Curse: Country-Level Evidence from Exogenous Variations in Resource Income," *Comparative Political Studies* 47 (2014): 1584–1610.
 - Laura Paler, "Keeping the Public Purse: An Experiment in Windfalls, Taxes, and the Incentives to Restrain Government," *American Political Science Review* 107 (2013): 706–725.
 - Sarah M. Brooks and Marcus J. Kurtz, "Oil 'Rents' and Political Development: What Do We Really Know about the Curse of Natural Resources?," *Comparative Political Studies* 55 (2022): 1698–1731.
 - Ferdinand Eibl and Steffen Hertog, "From Rents to Welfare: Why Are Some Oil-Rich States Generous to Their People?," *American Political Science Review* 118 (2024): 1324–1343.

Week 10: Foreign Aid

Tuesday, November 3

- Ilyana Kuziemko and Eric Werker, "How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations," *Journal of Political Economy* 114 (2006): 905–930.
- Sarah Blodgett Bermeo, "Aid is Not Oil: Donor Utility, Heterogeneous Aid, and the Aid-Democratization Relationship," *International Organization* 70 (2016): 1–32.

Recommended:

- Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," *Journal of Economic Growth* 5 (2000): 33–63.
- Ryan C. Briggs, "Does Foreign Aid Target the Poorest?," *International Organization* 71 (2017): 187–206.
- Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and Alastair Smith, "A Political Economy of Aid," *International Organization* 63 (2009): 309–340.

-
- Faisal Z. Ahmed, "The Perils of Unearned Foreign Income: Aid, Remittances, and Government Survival," *American Political Science Review* 106 (2012): 146–165.
 - Joseph Wright and Matthew Winters, "The Politics of Effective Foreign Aid," *Annual Review of Political Science* 13 (2010): 61–80.
 - James Raymond Vreeland and Axel Dreher, *The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council: Money and Influence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
 - Michael Faye and Paul Niehaus, "Political Aid Cycles," *American Economic Review* 102 (2012): 3516–3530.
 - Nathan Nunn and Nancy Qian, "US Food Aid and Civil Conflict," *American Economic Review* 104 (2014): 1630–66.
 - Jørgen Juel Andersen, Niels Johannesen, and Bob Rijkers, "Elite Capture of Foreign Aid: Evidence from Offshore Bank Accounts," *Journal of Political Economy* 130 (2022): 388–425.
 - Axel Dreher, Andreas Fuchs, Bradley Parks, Austin M. Strange, and Michael J. Tierney, "Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset," *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 13 (2021): 135–174.
 - Ann-Sofie Isaksson and Andreas Kotsadam, "Chinese Aid and Local Corruption," *Journal of Public Economics* 159 (2018): 146–159.

Week 11: The Political Economy of AI

Tuesday, November 3

- Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, "Learning from Ricardo and Thompson: Machinery and Labor in the Early Industrial Revolution and in the Age of Artificial Intelligence," *Annual Review of Economics* 16 (2024): 597–621.
- Yotam Margalit and Shir Raviv, "The Politics of Using AI in Policy Implementation: Evidence from a Field Experiment," *British Journal of Political Science* e13 (2026).

Recommended:

- Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, *Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle over Technology and Prosperity* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2023).
- Henry Farrell, "AI as Governance," *Annual Review of Political Science* 28 (2025): 375–392.
- Kate Crawford, *The Atlas of AI: Power, Politics, and the Planetary Costs of Artificial Intelligence* (Yale University Press, 2021).
- Erik Brynjolfsson, Danielle Li, and Lindsey Raymond, "Generative AI at Work," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 140 (2025): 889–942.
- Ajay Agrawal, Joshua S. Gans, and Avi Goldfarb, "Artificial Intelligence: The Ambiguous Labor Market Impact of Automating Prediction," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 33 (2019): 31–50.

Week 12: Wrap-Ups and Research Proposal Presentations

Tuesday, November 17

Week 13: Research Proposal Presentations

Tuesday, November 24